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Introduction
While ample attention typically is brought to capital invest-
ment decisions in long-range planning and strategic management,
less attention is often given to the role of strategic development
expenditures as vehicles for strategy implementation. While
undoubtedly most executives acknowledge the key importance of
strategic development expenditures for corporate success, it often
seems to bo the case that the planning of strategic development
projects is unduJy separated from the thrust of the long-range
planninq process. Thus, these substantial expenditures may not
contribute as much as they should to the strategic direction
setting of the firm.
In this article we shall discuss a system for managing
strategic development expenditures. While much progress has been
made in understanding how to manage development expenditures
qua projects, less emphasis has been put on the role of such systems
as part of the overall set of management systems. By taking the
viewpoint that a planning system for strategic projects is part of
a broader set of management systems, we shall explore its integration
with the long-range strategic planning system as well as, less
obviously, with the formal organization structure, the corporate
strategy, the control system and the incentive system.
Vancil defines strategic development expenditures as project
expenditures that are not recovered in the current year through
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higher sales or lower costs, but that are expected to pay off in
a "predetermined" number of future years . He identifies four
broad categories of such expenditures:
R ft D expenses , in order to come up with ideas and develop-
ments to be the basis for new products in the future.
Marketing expenses , such as the launching of a new product,
getting established in a new market or advertising.
Manufacturing overhead , for instance for getting the produc-
tion process for a new product going or for reducing costs of a
currently used manufacturing process.
General administrative overhead , such as intentional
overs taf finq.
We shall not specifically focus on how to plan for any particular
class of developmental expenditures, but instead denote them all
as strategic projects . For most strategic projects more than one
of Vancil's expenditure categories will be incurred. For instance,
before finally launching a new product several years of R&D
efforts may have taken place, manufacturing overhead may have been
incurred by developing a feasible production process in the pilot
plant, and extensive marketing expenses may have been incurred
through marketing research, test marketing and a full scale new
product introduction campaign. For any strategic project there can
exist several types of expenditures in varying amounts. The process
of planning for or making decisions relevant to a strategic project
See Vancil, Richard F., "Better Management of Corporate Development",
Harvard Business Review, Sept. -Oct., 1972.
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is in principle the same for all such projects, irrespective of
the dominance of its content (e.g., RM) dominated, market.inq
domi nal ed)
.
In their framework for management control, Scott Morton and
Lorange distinguish between decisions leading to the determination
of the budget and decisions about tracking the implementation of
2the budget. We shall follow the same dichotomy for strategic projects,
namely first discussing procedures for selecting strategic projects
as part of planning and budgeting, for then to discuss the follow-up
procedures for strategic project implementation. We shall also
discuss certain relevant aspects of the nature of strategic develop-
ment projects, in order to come up with a planning scheme reflecting
the problem. Finally, we shall discuss several organisation. ll
implications for the implementation of the scheme.
Linkage to Planning
Today's large corporations typically have adopted some form of
hierarchial structure, given their complexity and size, and its
consequential need for decentralized decision-making. The divisional
structure is the most common manifestation of this. There will be
various general types of planning tasks taking place in a typical
diversified firm
,
and the distribution of these planning tasks, we
2 Lorange, Peter and Michael S. Scott Morton, "A Framework for Manage-
ment Control Systems", Sloan Management Review , Fall 1974.
See Vancil, Richard F. and Peter Lorange, "Strategic Planning in
Diversified Companies", Harvard Business Review, Jan. -Feb., 1975.
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shall claim, will have a significant impact on the strategic
project planning process.
How can we ensure that strategic projects undertaken will be
consistent with the overall strategy of the firm? How can we control
that thr actual direction taken by the firm does not become a
function of more or less random outcomes from the strategic-
project development process? We shall suggest two measures to
facilitate congruence between desired and actual impact from
strategic projects of the company's direction.
A. Identification of a Project's Fit as Part of a Business Strategy
The first measure suggests relating the strategic project
selection closely to the long-range planning process. Given that
a division will be primarily responsible for its own long-term
success within the business area in which it has been chartered
to operate, a major responsibility for strategic project development
should be expected to rest on each division. Through a division's
own research, development and market analysis it will be expected
to be able to provide the new products necessary to maintain
or expand its position within the business. Strategic project
developments thus may be the most important tool for divisional
management to implement its strategy. It follows that the strategic
project selection thus should be closely integrated with the business
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plans of the divisions, i.e., that strategic project "programming"
should take place as part of division's planning.
Given that it will primarily be a division's objectives and
strategic;; that should set the guidance for the strategic project
selection, it becomes particularly Important that the business
objectives and strategies are stated in operational enough terms
to provide meaningful direction. A useful method to operationalize
business strategy is to have it specified in terms of a two-dimensional
classification of the major product segments as to market share
and market growth. There will consequently be four possible product
typoloqins, with distinctively different prospects for profitability,
capacity for funds generation or requirements to funds consumption.
This type of analysis will thus identify where within a
division's strategic product mix to launch strategic projects and
of what general kind. This is particularly important because it
will help provide a sense of direction to the strategic project
development process, specifically what types of end-products that
will be most desirable to be the output of the process.
An important extension is that the above strategic direction-
4 See Vancil, Richard F. and Peter Lorange, Op. Cit
.
See Henderson, Bruce D. , "The Experience Curve Reviewed, Part I-IV"
,
The Boston Consulting Group , Boston, 1973-1974, or Buzzell, Robert D.
,
Bradley T. Gale and Ralph G.M. Sultan, "Market Share—A Key to Profit-
ability," Harvard Business Review , Jan. -Feb. , 1975. For some
reservation against going uncritically after market share, see Fruham,
Jr., William E. , "Pyrrhic Victories in Fight for Market Share,"
Harvard Business Review, Sept. -Oct. , 1972.
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setting may provide the basis for more meaningful calculations of
the expected return on investment of a project. In order to calculate
an expected ROI there must be some assurement of the market potential
of the new project. This assessment is easier to do when being able
to position the project in a strategic context. It may, for
instance, become apparent that the growth rate of the perspective
product is likely to be so low that it cannot realistically be
expected to generate enough sales to yield a satisfactory ROI. Or,
it might be that the battle to create market share can be anticipated
to be so hard that the investment reguired cannot be expected to
yield enough return. It will be easier to perform a more accurate
economic analysis for a prospective new project if its strategic
positioning bas been made explicit.
B. Programming Across Functions, Budgeting for Each Function
Let us now turn to our second suggestion for maintaining
strategic direction of the strategic program process. "Each
functional department must understand the implications of a set of
programs for its own activities, and the department manager must
accept the tasks assigned him and the resources to be made available
to him." 6 Although each function thus needs plans there is a danger
that separate planning for each function might jeopardize the overall
project selection program point of view. Thus, Vancil has suggested
Vancil and Lorange, op. cit.
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an integrated planning and budgeting approach to the programming
function. One starts out making the plans for the projects across
organizational units; then to be followed by budgets for each organiza-
tional unit across project segments. Thus, step one is programming,
to ensure the strategic direction; step two is budgeting, to ensure
that each department's resources are adequate to carry out its share
of the program activities.
In instances when budgets will have to be trimmed down for
some reason, this is commonly done by cutting each department budget
by some fraction, often the same flat percentage rate "across the
board". This might, however, jeopardize the direction of the strategic
program effort, because of the resulting more or less random
disturbance effect on the progress of projects. Resource rationing
decisions like this should therefore be taken by reassessing the
importance of the programs for then to adjust each functional budget
accordinqly.
Characteristics of the Strategic Project Management Task
Any new strategic project follows a pattern of stages which
describes its life-cycle. For instance, a new drug product may
go from basic research, through laboratory experimental research,
through clinical research, through product development, through test
marketing, through full scale marketing, through "harvesting"
7
Vancil, op. cit.

(i.e., funds will no longer be invested in order to maintain
market share) until the product is finally withdrawn from the market.
The evolution of a strategic project through a series of discrete
stages has several conseguences, namely, the requirement of specialized
skills within a functional area, the necessity to balance "workloads"
between functional areas, the need for a mechanism to transfer a project
from one functional area to another, and the addressing of an appropriate
task definition for each functional area.
A. Specialized Skills
To take a product through each stage requires specialized
skills. For instance, during the basic research stage there is
a net;d for scientists trained in basic disciplines. At the pilot plant
experimentation stage there is a need for other scientists with
different training as well as special purpose laboratory equipment,
etc. At the test marketing stage there is a need for marketing
researchers, and at the full scale marketing stage a fullblown
sales force with supporting marketing services organization. Thus,
the company must make fixed investments in specialized human skills
and equipment. The skills and equipment needed are typically very
different from one stage to another. Consequently, at least
in the short run, these skill factors will be transferable only to
a limited extent from one function to another. Also in the short
run it will be difficult to have such skills transferred to and/or
from outside resources. Hence, it becomes necessary for the company
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t<i moke I i xed investments in human skills and equipment for each
of the specialized functions. If the skills to carry ouL one function
are weak or lacking this will not only jeopardize the entire project
development at that stage but also weaken the entire project
development process.
B. Balancing the Workloads of the Functions
Given that the investments in human skills and equipment are
largely fixed, that thus each specialized function's capacity cannot
be easily increased or decreased, at least not in the short run,
and th.it the skills and equipment can only to a small extent be
transferred for use between functions, it follows that each specialized
function will have relatively fixed capacity. If the workload
requirements to one function become larger than its capacity then
delays in one or more strategic projects will be the result. If, on
the other hand, a function's workload requirements become less than its
capacity then some capacity will be under-utilized. The fixed costs
of maintaining that function's capacity of course will be the same.
We consequently are faced with a balancing problem for the
choice of the portfolio of strategic projects. For each of the
specialized functions it becomes essential to have just enough
projects at that stage to effectively and efficiently utilize
capacity. For instance, one will have to make sure that not an
a See Balthasar, U. and S. Gutzwiller, "Steady State Concept and
Portfolio Management in Research and Development," paper presented at
the 45th TIMS/ORSA National Meeting, Boston, 1974.
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unproportionately high number of basic research projects are undertaken,
because this in turn may load to a hiqh likelihood of bottlenecks
at later stages. The opposi te might, of course, just as well happen,
namely that too few basic research projects are undertaken to yield
high enough likelihood of full utilization of say the sales force
at a future point in time. It is, of course, not enough only to
coordinate this overall mix of the project portfolio in terms of
the number of projects solely, but also in terms of the uncertainty
of the projects, to be discussed in the following section.
C. Transfer of Projects from One Stage to Another
G ivon the capacity considerations of the specialized functions,
as discussed in the previous two paragraphs, it becomes particularly
important to develop a procedure for deciding when a strategic project
should be transferred from one stage to another. Two major factors
of consideration should be brought to bear on this decision. First,
what ultimately matters for the company is that a strategic project in
fact will ultimately succeed to the extent that it will actually
generate new sales (or the cost savings) . Thus, when moving a
project from say the research function to the development function
the criterion for deciding on the project's transfer is not only
whether or not the research on the project has resulted in satisfactory
progress to merit such a move. Rather, the proper criterion should
be whether the project is judged to have a reasonable probability of
being successful in the market-place, given a reasonable investment in
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the project over a reasonable period of time. Consequently, the
criterion for moving a project should contain both inputs relating
to the likelihood of a satisfactory completion of a given function
as well as inputs relating to the likelihood of the project being
able to successfully pass the other stages. However, the overriding
consideration should be the likelihood of final success of a
strategic project. As a consequence, inputs from the given function
that the project has just been passing through as well as from
all remaining functions that a project will have to pass should be
brought to bear on any derision to move a project ahead. For instance,
it does not make much sense to move a project from the development
stc^ge to the pilot plant testing stage if the people of the test
marketing stage are already virtually certain that the ultimate
product cannot be successfully marketed. They may know that other
products are already on the market or that the market potential will
be very small, which is a consideration that the R&D people may
not have ascertained.
Given that the uncertainty of a project is determined as
a function of the likelihood of success of it passing all stages,
it is important that the degree of uncertainty be consistently
balanced from one stage to another when considering the portfolio
of projects handled by each function at a time. This does, of
course, not imply that the probability of success for a project should
be the same at each stage. As the project proceeds from stage to
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staqe the probability of success will be expected to increase. It
is logical that a project would appear more risky during the
research stage than during the test marketing stage. It may be
that the probability of success for a project at the research stage
on the average is only 10%, at the development stage it may be 20%
on the average and at the test marketing stage it may on the average
be 50%. These proportionate differences in uncertainties should then
be approximately maintained. For any strategic project develop-
ment organization there will thus be a set of decreasing uncertainties
to be proportionately maintained over time in order to ensure
consistent uncertainty considerations.
The existence of capacity imbalance between the functions
may however at times modify this„ For instance, when a tunction
has surplus capacity it may be admissible to take on additional
and more risky projects. Thus, the decision to transfer a project
from one function to the next may have to be modified in cases
where the capacity balancing of the workloads of each function
merits this.
The nature of the strategic project development task can
be summarized as in Exhibit 1. There will be two major sets
of considerations; to decide on the progress of each strategic
project, based on its own merit—as exemplified by Question 1
in the exhibit—and balancing the capacity of the segments of
one's project organization— as exemplified by Question 2 in the
exhibit. The latter set of considerations thus leads to a modi-
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Exhibit 1. The dual nature of strategic project development
fication of the former set of considerations, until the two dimen-
sions are in balance.
How Do We Define the Functions?
In order to operationalize the dual strategic project phenomenon
as it has just been outlined, it seems important to be able to
identify what might be a reasonable division of the project develop-
ment task into discrete functions. It seems as if this categoriza-
tion might be quite different from company to company, depending on
the nature of its business. However, a few general considerations
might be suggested.
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1'irst, the functions should b<> split up in .such a way that
economies of specialization can be achieved as much as possible.
It seems important that these functional groupings correspond to
the actual functions on the organization chart. These should
be reasonably self-contained, there should be as unambiguous criteria
for performance measurement as possible for each function, and there
should be incentives for performance fulfillment.
A word of caution should however be raised about the way
this specialization will be carried out. It has been demonstrated
by many that integration among the participants of the strategic
9
project development is important. Organizations with more of this
integration tend to be more successful with their new projects.
Thus, the challenge will be to define the functions in such a way
that specialization can take place within an integrated overall
organization.
Organizational Involvement
We have already identified the relationship between a division's
business strategy and strategic projects as vehicles for implementation
9 See, for instance, Lawrence P.R. and J.W. Lorsch, Organization
and Environment
, Division of Research, Harvard Business School,
Boston, 1967. Argyris, C. , Organization and Innovation , Dorsey
Press, 1965 or Burns, T. , and G. Stalker, The Management of
Innovation, Tavistock, London, 1961.
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of divisional strategy. In this section, we shall discuss in more
detail what the major responsibilities of the divisions in managing
the planning of strategic projects will then be. Later we shall
discuss the organizational responsibilities of the corporate level
and of the functional departments.
A. Divisional Involvement
First, it should be the responsibility of the division management
to create its own project organization with investment in human
skills and equipment to carry out the various stages of project
development. Typically this will be done through entrusting these
tasks to various functional groups, such as the R&D department, the
marketing department, etc. Given the nature of these types of invest-
ments, being predominantly fixed, at least in the short run, it also
becomes important to ensure relatively equal capacity between the
various functions. An audit of the capacity of the strategic
project organization of a division might reveal a profile roughly
as indicated in Exhibit 2. (Capacity is used in a broad sense
to indicate the volume of project development that the function is
capable of handling, assuming a minimum level of professional
quality.) The aim of the division management should be to work
for a long-term development of its strategic project organization
which eliminates capacity differentials, i.e., attempts to flatten
the profile curve so that it becomes horizontal.
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Exhibit 2. Profiles of the Capacity of the Strategic Project
Organization of Divisions with Scarce Capacity in
Basic Research (Solid Lino) and in Marketing
(Punctured Line)
Secondly, division management will be responsible for operation-
alizing the process of moving a strategic project from the domain
of one function to another. We have discussed what might be a
proper criterion for deciding on whether or not to move a project.
The task of deciding on moving a project from one stage to another
may be entrusted to a team of managers which will oversee the progress
of the project. This project steering team should be composed
of members from all functions that the project is at or has not
yet reached. The dominant contingent of members should however
come from the function that presently is responsible for the project.
When the decision is to be taken to move a project from, say, the
10 See Goggin, William, "How the Multidimensional Structure Works
at Dow Corning", Harvard Business Review, Jan. -Feb. 1974.
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basic research stage to the clinical testing stage the project
steering team is composed of persons not only from basic research
but also from clinical testing, as well as from production development,
market research and marketing. All the remaining functions will thus
have a say as to the likelihood of them being able to take the
project successfully past their particular function. As a project
makes progress, the composition of the steering committee may shift.
Within a given function, the team members from this function will
be dominating. When a project has passed a function the team members
from this function will no longer normally take part, given that
their presence will no longer be necessary for assessing the probab-
ility of success of the project.
Finally, the division should be responsible for implementing
policies for carrying out the balancing of the project portfolio
so that slacks or bottlenecks can be avoided in the utilization
of the project organization. The task of balancing the division's
portfolio of projects might be undertaken by a committee chaired
by the division vice president with the head of each functional
area involved in the staging of projects as members. This may be
called the division portfolio committee . Whenever a new project
comes up the question of "fit" with the rest of the project
portfolio should be raised. Special focus should be put on periodic
evaluations of the "starting-point" and the "end-point" of the project
development process, namely, do we have enough, too many or too few
basic projects to fulfill the need for new projects by marketing (and
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not too few to utilize the marketing organization fully or too many
to be handled by the marketing organization)
.
Two types of coordinating committees will thus be chartered with the
implementation of a division's strategic project decisions. For each
project a steering committee will thus monitor the progress of the project,
i.e. , answer Question 1 of Exhibit 1. For the balancing of the projects
the project portfolio committee will monitor the overall picture, i.e.,
answer Question 2 of Exhibit 1. While there will only be one project
portfolio committee in a division there will normally be a number of project
steering committees. There will of course be a practical limit to the
number of project steering committees that will be operational. Given that
one would avoid having managers participating in committee meetings all the
time a strategic project may be judged to be over a certain size or impor-
tance to merit its own steering committee. Lesser projects may be grouped
together to be handled by one steering committee. On the other hand, the
project steering committee must maintain an intimate understanding of each
project. Thus, there are limits to how many projects that one steering
committee can effectively handle. To determine a reasonable workload for
each committee one might want to distinguish between three types of projects:
entirely new areas of business, full-blown extensions of present lines of
business, and minor improvements of present lines of business. The first
type of project will, of course, require the most attention; the last
project type the least.
B. Corporate Involvement
What now about project development at the corporate level? Should
project development have no role at corporate level, given the division's
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involvement? Wo shall claim that there are at least two factors which
suqqest an important involvement in strategic project development by the
corporate level complementing the divisional involvement. These are the
need for strategic project evaluations that may be outside the traditional
business areas or that may involve more than one division ar.d the attempt
to avoid duplications of efforts and investments in similar research skills
by several divisions. We shall discuss each of these in turn.
i. Strategic Projects Outside the Traditional Business Areas
There may now and then come up new projects that look promising but
do not fit any of the existing businesses. A central strategic project
team with, say, competence within R&D and market research might be
assigned to such projects, in order to ensure that the projects get a chance
and do not get "drowned" between the ordinary projects of a division if it
had been entrusted to one of these. Also, such a central group may have
more freedom and less inhibition to scan the environment to come up with
strategic projects within entirely new business areas for growth and oppor-
tunities. Further, there may be situations where a strategic project of
one division will lead into the business domain of another division. For
instance, a project undertaken by a pharmaceutical corporation's division
for anaesthetics intending to come up with a better local anaesthetic may
turn out to be of use for treatment against arhytmic heart conditions.
But this lays within the domain of the division for heart disease medications.
In this instance, there will be a need for the corporate level to "disentangle'
the two divisions.
Finally, when acquisitions or diversitudes are to be undertaken a
corporate strategic project competence may assist top management in
evaluating the potential of the proposed new business, or, when it comes
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to divesting a strategic project, to give less biased advice than the
strategic project management of the division in question. In total, a
corporate strategic project competence seems necessary to undertake tasks comple-
mentary to the divisions strategic project tasks, as well as for managing
potential conflicts of interest between two divisions or between a division
and the corporate level.
ii. Duplication of Strategi c Project Capabilities
Let us now turn to the question of potential duplication of efforts
by the divisions in the sense that they may build up similar strategic
project competences, i.e., invest in largely the same types of people and
equipment. Given the role of strategic projects as part of each division's
effort to succeed in their businesses, we have thus far stressed the need
for each division to develop its own project organization. Thus, within
the company as a whole there will typically be several, say, basic research
groups, market research groups, and so on. One might ask whether it would
be possible to combine these groups, at least to some extent. This might
lead to a number of advantages. Notably, it would probably be possible to
incur some benefits from economies of scales, and, thus, get the task done
with less fixed investment in people and equipment. Also, the professional
quality of a centralized group of people might increase, given that the
division's specialist groups may be so small that it will be difficult to
maintain a high professional level. Thus, centralization is an option to
ensure the critical mass of people. The extent to which it is possible to
obtain benefits of these sorts depends a lot on how close the divisions'
businesses are to each other, in terms of basic technology and/or markets.
In some instances it may be possible to group together project activities of
some if not all divisions.
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A major problem with joint divisional project development capabilities
is the divorce of one of the key determinants of a division's success from its
direct control. Thus, there might be a danger of loss of quality in the
project development offered to a division. Particularly, txio outlook for
the final end use may become less focussed when project development is
divorced from local business know-how, most critically at the marketing end.
We are faced with the classical problem of costs vs. benefits of centralization
vs. decentralization due to the trading off between size advantages in
economies of scales and advantages due to improved quality of decision-
making when drawing on local know-how.
iii. The Corporate Strategic Project Committee
The above dilemma may be approached by means of making use of so-called
organizational matric structures. For instance, although each division has
its own basic research group which is part of the division's strategic project
organization and thus reports to the division management, the basic research
groups of all the divisions may also report to a corporate basic research
office. This office will attempt to undertake coordination when possible
so that economies of scales can be achieved. All the basic researchers within
the company can be brought together in this way, without detracting from the
division specialization point of view. Integration between the divisions'
specialized functional project organization elements may be particularly
useful for information and know-how exchange.
Exhibit 3 summarizes the overall strategic organizational integrating
efforts proposed.
See Galbraith, Jay , "Organizational Design: An Information Processing
View," Sloan School of Management Working Paper, Cambridge, 1969.
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Kxhibit 3. The Strategic Project Committee Structure
Motivational Considerations
At the outset let us notice that a decentralized corporate structure
usually implies that the economic performance of each of the decentralized
units is being measured, and that normally also incentive compensation is
based on performance. We have noticed that the long-term success of the
businesses of a company largely depends on the divisions' strategic project
organizations ability to come up with sufficient outputs. Also, we have
noticed the uncertain nature of strategic project developments. All projects
will be uncertain, but the more uncertain projects will typically have the
higher potential rewards associated with them.
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For the company as a whole the overall riskiness in its entire
portfolio of strategic projects is a combination of some very risky
projects, some conservative ones and some in the middle. The overall
riskiness of the corporation's project portfolio will not increase
significantly with the undertaking of a very risky but potentially promising
new project, given some size of the portfolio, because the risk will
"average out" over the entire portfolio. For a division the ability to
undertake another promising but risky project without significantly
altering the risk characteristics of its strategic project portfolio
is a function of the portfolio size too. However, a division's strategic
project portfolio will naturally be smaller than the corporate portfolio.
Consequently, a division will have fewer projects between which to "average
out" a new risky project. Given this, a division manager can be expected
to be less mclined to take on risky but potentially very promising
12
projects. When each division manages its strategic project portfolio,
with an implicit degree of riskiness attached to the project portfolios,
then the corporate project portfolio, with its implicit risk character-
istics, is found by adding together the division portfolios. One might
assume that this corporate strategic portfolio is having more conser-
vative risk characteristics than if the corporate portfolio had been
" Several research studies have documented a tendency towards risk
aversion in research project selection in large firms, see Hamberg,
David, "Invention in the Industrial Laboratory", Journal of
Political Economy, April, 1963.

-24-
chosen directly by top management. Thus, by delegating the responsibility
for choosing the divisional portfolios the company as a whole may move in
a more conservative direction.
We shall offer two suggestions for at least partially overcoming
this problem. First, the corporate project board may play a role and
attempt to assess the overall corporate risk-taking and, if necessary,
"upgrade" some of the divisional project portfolios to become more
risk-prone. Whenever such "interventions" take place special care should
however be taken to adjust for potential damage to the division's
performance. The burden of forced added risk-taking by the division
should at least to some extent be carried by corporate funds to these
projects.
Secondly, the incentive compensation system for individuals
within the strategic project development area should recognize that the
task is less programmed then for most other tasks within the firm. Long-
term track-records should be developed for the people involved in
order to get some feel for performance. There should be an audit procedure
for project failure to identify what portions of the work on the project
that had been up to satisfaction and what portion that went wrong.
14
Other procedures of the same nature might also be developed.
In the above, we have of course assumed that the attitudes towards
risk taking in fact will be determined as a consequence of project port-
folio size differences. We might of course nevertheless encounter, say,
a very conservative corporate management which may be more cautious than
the young, aggressive division managers. A general conservative attitude
may more than counterbalance the risk-taking advantages due to project
portfolio size. We shall however not discuss this situation here.
See Newman, William H. , Constructive Control, Prentice-Hall, N.Y., 1975.
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Conclusion
Although the future success of many companies depends highly on their
ability to undertake strategic projects to have carried out intended strategies,
many expenditures on strategic projects are being spent in vain. The intended
"booster" from the strategic projects all too often do not materialize. This
article has suggested an approach for improving the performance resulting from
the strategic project expenditures. The approach is built on three inter-
related considerations.
First, the planning for strategic expenditure projects should be
integrated with the business strategy of each division. In this context it is
important that the divisions' strategies are stated operationally enough to
provide guidance for strategic project selection. The concept of clarifying
the division's product as to market share (high-low) as well as growth (high-
low) should be useful for this. Also, it seems important that a division's
programs are given primary attention during the planning stage for them to
be followed by each function's budgets.
Second, the strategic project management task should be seen as having
a number of specific characteristics that need to be explicitly considered
in order to facilitate effective strategic project management. One issue is
the staging of a project from one function to the other. Another issue is
the balancing of project load for each function. A third issue is the overall
balancing of projects to the capacity of the project organization.
Third, there are several organizational tasks that need to be handled
in order to implement the strategic planning project approach. Several
committee types for this will probably have to be established, namely
project steering committees, project portfolio committees and a corporate
project committee.
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While each company of course will face different problems in
managing their strategic project planning we feel that the issues
raised are of a general nature and should be addressed in each case.
Only when those issues are understood can one expect a truLy effective
strategic project planninq.



